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Foreword
On Law Day, May 1, 1970, in historic Colton Hall at Monterey,
California, Donald R. Wright took his seat upon the bench of the Supreme
Court of California as head of the court. It was at once a challenging and
auspicious occasion. An able and respected practitioner at the bar, a sea-
soned trial and appellate judge at all levels of the judicial system, the new
Chief Justice assumed the helm after three decades of distinguished leader-
ship by Chief Justices Gibson and Traynor. This public debut, in which he
impressed all present by his conduct of the session, was followed on the
succeeding Wednesday by the court's weekly conference at which he pre-
sided with a savoir faire literally amazing to his colleagues. Thus, the
Wright court came into being. Over a period of almost seven years, its Chief
continued to surpass all predictions about him. His opinions added luster to
the court. His administration of the judicial branch was masterful. In a
word, his performance was superb.
The court which he joined, however, was far from being a mere
impersonal or abstract entity. On the contrary, possessing realistic and
tangible dimensions by virtue of its tradition, decisions, and the per-
sonalities of its then current membership, it could well fit the description
given the nation's highest Court by Justice Frankfurter: "To be sure, the
Court is an institution, but individuals, with all their diversities of endow-
ment, experience and outlook, determine its actions."' Although the new
member might not have agreed with Holmes that "[w]e are very quiet there
but it is the quiet of a storm center,'"2 he might nevertheless have sensed at
the start that high court justices "move freely in wider orbits" 3 and "are
fired with an exuberant enthusiasm [so that] [j]udicial law-making is burst-
ing out all over." 4 It was soon clear, however, that while the new Chief
Justice brought to the court a strong institutional sense, he was also aware
that judicial decisionmaking by a state's highest court must be responsive to
social change and must reckon with the problems of a complex and pluralist-
ic society. Or, as Harold Laski put it, a great judge "must be capable of stem
1. F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 44 (1961).
2. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 292 (2d ed. 1952).
3. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1 (1976).
4. L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as JAFFE].
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logic, and yet refuse to sacrifice to logic the hopes and fears and wants of
men." ' 5 So when the occasion required, Chief Justice Wright was not
adverse to moving freely in wider orbits-indeed there was every indication
of his enthusiasm for such galactic missions.
During the six years and nine months of his service on the California
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Wright authored one hundred seventy-two
majority opinions, eight concurring opinions, three concurring and dissent-
ing opinions, and three dissenting opinions: one hundred eighty-six opinions
in all. They are the carefully wrought products of a composite author-the
common law lawyer unearthing and organizing the facts of the record, the
trial judge probing the posture and tactics of the contest below, the appellate
scholar searching for a controlling principle, and the civilized and compas-
sionate man fitting it all into proper perspective. Each case was a matter of
his personal and intense concern, from his first connection with it either as a
petition for hearing or as an original proceeding. In cases in which he felt a
hearing should be granted, he frequently read large portions of the record,
reporting back to the court in conference, so as to satisfy himself and assure
his colleagues as to the nature and magnitude of the issues involved and the
necessity of having them heard by the California Supreme Court. In the
preparation of an opinion, although the theories of the parties may have been
adequately congealed into points in the briefs, he often immersed himself in
the voluminous testimony in order to get the "feel" or "flavor" of the case.
Thoroughly familiar with the record, he decided the case in a full and
carefully reasoned opinion, and, to use Judge Learned Hand's words,
"never disguised the difficulties, as lazy judges do who win the game by
sweeping all the chessmen off the table.' '6 We may say of the Chief Justice
what Professor Freund has written of Justice Brandeis: "As a judge he acted
on the principle that knowledge must precede understanding, as understand-
ing should precede judging, and to this end he committed himself to almost
incredible labors of investigation and exposition, so that what he touched
might be illuminated."
7
His opinions have made significant contributions to California law in a
wide range of subjects. Within the limitations of this tribute, some idea of
his influence may be obtained from the following salient examples. In the
field of torts, discarding a long-standing common law rule to the contrary,
he held a vendor of alcoholic beverages liable to an injured third person for
furnishing such beverages to the obviously intoxicated patron, who later
5. Laski, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 139 (F. Frankfurter ed. 1931).
6. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1939).




caused the injuries;8 and he imposed strict liability in tort on a successor
corporation for the defective product of its corporate predecessor; 9 but in an
arm's length stock purchase transaction, he declined to hold the seller's
attorneys liable to the buyer for negligent advice to the seller, not foresee-
ably to be transmitted to the buyer.' 0 In the field of contracts, he held that a
general class of unemployed persons were not third party beneficiaries of a
contract between corporate manufacturers and the United States government
to provide job training under a government program to alleviate unemploy-
ment."1 In probate law, he defined the nature and scope of an executor's
duty in the collection and preservation of the assets of the estate.t 2 In
massive litigation of the utmost concern to the people of this state, Chief
Justice Wright authored opinions for an unanimous court in each of the
following cases: adopting new reapportionment plans due to the Legisla-
ture's continuing failure to pass legislative and congressional reapportion-
ment bills acceptable to the Governor; 13 defining and determining pueblo
water rights; 14 and determining the validity and constitutionality of munici-
pal residential rent controls.15
In criminal law, drawing extensively on his experience as a trial judge,
he wrote prolifically on a wide variety of subjects, including: the judicial
power of a magistrate to try a charged offense as a misdemeanor, free from
any statutory requirement of the prosecutor's consent; 16 denial of the right to
a speedy trial due to pre-arrest delay;' 7 the discretion of the trial judge to
exclude evidence of a prior felony conviction; 18 the application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel against the state to preclude the defendant's
conviction of murder on a theory of vicarious liability for his confederate's
conduct, where the latter had been acquitted of the murder charge; 19 and the
rejection, in the absence of statutory authority, of a notice of alibi require-
8. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
9. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
10. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
11. Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc., I 1 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1974).
12. Estate of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975).
13. Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 516 P.2d 6, 110 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973); see also
Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d 595, 492 P.2d 385, 99 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1972).
14. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1975).
15. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976).
16. Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 1 19, 485 P.2d 1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971).
17. Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 734, 478 P.2d 10, 91 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1970).
18. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
19. People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
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ment.20 Apart from the above, in a distinguished line of cases beginning
with In re Minnis21 and culminating in Gee v. Brown,22 he applied princi-
ples of due process to uphold the rights of probationers, prisoners, and
parolees. Finally, in landmark opinions, he held that capital punishment
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of former article
I, section 6, of the California Constitution, 23 and that in certain instances a
statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment may be constitutionally
impermissible as applied in that the term is so disproportionate to the offense
as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of article
I, section 17, of the California Constitution. 24 The closing language of the
first of these two landmark opinions, People v. Anderson,25 is a hallmark of
his courage and compassion. "We have concluded that capital punishment
is impermissibly cruel. It degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in
its processes. It is unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and is
incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process." 26 One is
reminded of Professor Jaffe's assessment: "The great judge was great
because when the occasion cried out for new law he dared to make it. "27
Pervading and vitalizing his functions as Chief Justice and as Chairman
of the Judicial Council and closely interwoven with his role as the author of
many opinions was a high quality of leadership. At once intelligent and
courageous, his leadership was uniquely effective because of the warmth
and humor of the man himself in his dealings with his colleagues and with
those outside the judiciary. At the weekly conferences on petitions for
hearings and other pending matters, he always came fully prepared; despite
the massive volume of petitions and other multifold duties limiting his time,
he had personally read and digested all material, invariably working full
Saturdays and Sundays to do so. In the ensuing discussion, he brought to
bear on crucial points his experience as a trial judge and as a presiding judge
of the largest trial court in the country, frequently exposing the utter
impracticality of points urged by the parties or set forth in the research
memoranda of the court. A hearing having been granted, he carefully
assigned the cases for the preparation of calendar memoranda and of opin-
ions in light of the justices' workload, not favoring himself but in fact
assuming a greater burden of work than the circumstances called for.
20. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
21. 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).
22. 14 Cal. 3d 571, 536 P.2d 1017, 122 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975).
23. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
24. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
25. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
26. Id. at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
27. JAFFE, supra note 4, at 1.
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On the bench he presided with dignity and firmness, but withal, a
sympathetic concern for counsel before him. A stickler for argument within
the allotted time, regardless of the number of questions from the bench, he
never failed to recognize when fairness compelled a relaxation of the rule. In
separate but related cases, counsel heard a strong admonition from the Chief
that the court's time was not to be taken up with repetitive argument by
different counsel on an identical issue and that counsel would be well-
advised to adjourn to the lobby and agree upon a division of the field of
controversy. Yet, during argument itself, the Chief Justice was attentive and
relaxed, making copious notes, suddenly whipping out a coruscating com-
ment from the bench-often an allusion to literature or music-sometimes
as probing as a spotlight to illumine the point, occasionally in a puckish
manner to prod the advocate, frequently in the form of a favorite query
indicative of his philosophy-' 'But counsel, would you really want to live
in that kind of society?"
At the meetings of the Judicial Council he won wide respect for his
mastery of the agenda. Deeply involved in the committee work and thor-
oughly conversant with the welter of proposals under consideration, he
provided the expert advice and personal guidance indispensable to the
discharge of the council's constitutional duty.
The outstanding record of achievement made by Chief Justice Wright is
in keeping with the finest tradition of our high courts. Endowed with superb
qualities of mind and heart, he dedicated himself to the responsibilities of
his office, marshalling, even at personal risk, all of his energies toward the
carrying on and preservation of the tradition of the court as an institution and
as the palladium of the judiciary's independence. Extraordinarily gifted, he
concealed a keen and agile mind under an unassuming and lighthearted
demeanor. Essentially a civilized man with deep interests in literature,
music, and art, he abhorred the flamboyant, the pretentious, and the taste-
less. With a high sense of duty and complete integrity, he had the hard-
working judge's disdain for those who would avoid the arduous task. To his
colleagues on the court, he was a person of understanding, good humor,
refreshing candor, and warm solicitude; always a believer in judicial colle-
giality, nevertheless, when the responsibility was his alone, he responded
with courage as the leader of the court. Along with his beautiful and
gracious wife, Margo, he was always the cultured man in all phases of his
personal and public life. He was indeed a judge's judge.
In his essay on Holmes, Justice Cardozo begins with a quotation from
Euripides: "How can I praise thee and not overpraise, and yet not mar the
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grace by stint thereof?" 28 We face the same dilemma. We feel that our
esteem and affection for Chief Justice Wright remain ill-expressed. We
sense that our praise of him remains inadequate.
Raymond L. Sullivan*
28. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 682 (1931).
* Retired Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California.
